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The Federal Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege After Jaffee: Truth and Other




There were some surprises in the decision in Jaffee v. Redmond,1
but the fact that the Supreme Court recognized a psychotherapist-
patient privilege as a matter of federal common law is not one of
them. Nor is it surprising that the Court extended the privilege to
sessions with a clinical social worker. It is true that the modern Court
has been skeptical of privilege law,2 absorbing the twentieth century
version of Enlightenment rationalism found in the work of two
prominent commentators who stressed the obligation to testify and
the right of courts to have everyone's help unless some overriding so-
cial purpose could be clearly advanced by a privilege rule.3 The
* Henry S. Lindsley Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
1. 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996).
2. The Court has addressed various aspects of federal privilege law in seven post-
Rules decisions. With the notable exception of attorney-client privilege, most of the
Court's decisions reject privilege claims or provide only modest support. See University
of Pennsylvania v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 188 (1990) (rejecting federal peer review
privilege); United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 565 (1989) (permitting in camera review
of documents claimed to fit crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege); Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981) (expanding corporate attorney-client privi-
lege by rejecting restrictive control group standard in favor of privilege covering state-
ments by corporate employees on points relating to the subject matter of their employ-
ment); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) (slicing federal spousal
testimonial privilege in half by holding that it belongs only to witness-spouse, not to party
spouse); United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 374 (1980) (finding no federal legislator
privilege, despite state privilege rules); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169 (1979) (re-
jecting newspaper editorialist's privilege); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707-13
(1974) (approving qualified presidential privilege).
3. Wigmore and McCormick argued that privileges cost more than they deliver,
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Court moved the other way in Jaffee because it could not reject, in
federal question cases, a doctrine that all states recognize.4 Nor could
it turn its back on the therapeutic enterprise that is so important in
modern life, in both the private and public sectors, and specifically in
the area of social work in which state governments are so heavily in-
volved.
Nor is it surprising that the Court relied on an instrumental ra-
tionale (encouraging therapy), or that it looked to state law as the
wellspring of the federal privilege. In adopting the instrumentalist
view, the opinion in Jaffee reflects the continuing influence of the
same commentators. In deferring so much to state law, the Court in
Jaffee, commendably, seems to have understood what nearly every-
one else understands-that privileges are substantive, that state
privilege law is a feature in the federal landscape in diversity cases,
and that in the absence of any developed federal rule or congres-
sional guidance it is eminently sensible to look to state law in federal
question cases.
But there are some surprises in Jaffee, one of which connects
with the theme of this conference (tensions in the quest for truth and
the implementation of other policies). It is surprising in Jaffee that
the Court ignored the argument that sustaining a privilege claim
contributing to the general skepticism about privilege law, which leads to tedious judicial
comments that privileges are to be narrowly construed. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2291 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (stating that benefits of attor-
ney-client privilege are "indirect and speculative" while its "obstruction" is "plain and
concrete"); CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72 (1954)
(explaining that privileges "shut out the light" to protect relationships: doubtful that they
"really need this sort of protection bought at such a price"). See also CHARLES TILFORD
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72 (John Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (keeping the original
language). At least one commentator has argued that this anti-privilege bias is part of the
fabric of Federal Rule of Evidence 501. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Hegelian Ap-
proach to Privileges Under Federal Rule of Evidence 501: The Restrictive Thesis, the Ex-
pansive Antithesis, and the Contextual Synthesis, 73 NEB. L. REV. 511, 541 (1994) (noting
that Rule 501 "supplies a substantive policy bias in favor of the admission of relevant, re-
liable evidence," that privilege law can block such proof, and that the Rules "have a built-
in bias against that type of loss").
4. In a footnote, the Court cites provisions from the fifty states and the District of
Columbia creating psychotherapist-patient privileges. See Jaffee. 116 S. Ct. at 1929 n.ll.
Jaffee ignored the foundational federal authority for this privilege, Taylor v. United
States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Jaffee cited two post-Rules federal cases recogniz-
ing the privilege, and four others refusing to recognize it. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1927.
For a more complete listing of federal cases on point, see CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER &
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 210 nn.1-2 (2d ed. 1995) (noting that ten
cases support the privilege; nine go the other way).
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would enable the defendant to avoid direct challenges to her credi-
bility by shielding from view the sessions in which she spoke about
legally relevant events. It is also surprising that Jaffee gives so little
thought or guidance to federal courts in developing federal privilege
law from state statutory law. This Essay examines these surprises in
Jaffee, while addressing three main questions raised by the decision.
First, should we have such a psychotherapist-patient privilege,
and if so, should it extend to sessions with clinical social workers? I
argue that we should. The main objection, which is that the privilege
costs too much in lost evidence, pales in comparison to our best esti-
mate of benefits, which are both tangible and intangible. They in-
lude an increase in psychotherapy, which we view as socially impor-
tant, and protection of privacy, which we value as an end in itself.
Second, does it make sense to rest a federal privilege on state
law, and how can we sensibly do that? I argue that it does make
sense to draw heavily on state privilege law because it is better devel-
oped than federal law, and rests on considerable experience. The dis-
tinctly federal interests that arise in litigation based on federal sub-
stantive law do not require federal courts to fashion a separate body
of privilege law, and there is no reason to fear that following the lead
of states will thwart or undermine federal concerns. But the practical
problems of fashioning a single body of federal law out of the dispa-
rate and detailed state statutes suggests that federal courts would be
better off simply applying state psychotherapist-patient privilege law,
even at the cost of nonuniformity across the federal system, rather
than trying to fashion distinctly federal law.
Third, how should federal courts address certain hard cases?
Difficulties arise in the common situation in which the privilege
claimant is a party to the suit who testifies at trial, as happened in Jaf-
fee itself. Also, we can expect major challenges in sexual assault and
child abuse trials. On the former point, both the Seventh Circuit and
Supreme Court opinions ignore the plaintiff's provocative argument
that therapy sessions may have shaped the defendant's memory and
testimony. The privilege should apply even here, however, because
making an exception would sap its vitality, and the wiser course is to
make an exception in the narrower class of cases where the privilege
claimant puts mental condition in issue. On the latter point (what to
do in abuse and sexual assault cases), each federal court should cer-
tainly look to the law of the state where it sits.
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1. The Jaffee Case
Jaffee was a federal suit against police officer Mary Lu Redmond
and the city that employed her, seeking damages for the death of
Ricky Allen, whom Redmond fatally shot during a disturbance at an
apartment house.5 The complaint was filed only a week after the
event, claiming wrongful death under state law and a violation of
federal civil rights.6 At the same time, Officer Redmond attended
the first of more than fifty counseling sessions with Karen Beyer, a
licensed clinical social worker, where the two discussed the shooting
Learning of these sessions, the plaintiff asked for notes that Beyer
had made and sought to depose Beyer and Redmond on what was
said In the belief that the psychotherapist-patient privilege reaches
only sessions with psychologists or psychiatrists, the trial court over-
ruled Redmond's objection.9 The court ordered disclosure of the
notes and told Beyer and Redmond to answer questions put by the
plaintiff, but the two were uncooperative, and the judge ultimately
told the jury it could draw a negative inference about the refusal to
testify about the therapy sessions.1°
The plaintiff won a verdict, but defendants appealed and the
Seventh Circuit reversed." It found that there is a federal psycho-
therapist-patient privilege, that it applies to sessions with a licensed
clinical social worker, and that the judge, therefore, should not have
invited the negative inference. 2 Further, the Seventh Circuit found
that the privilege is subject to a balancing test: disclosure may be or-
5. SeeJaffee, 116 S. Ct at 1925.
6. See id. at 1926.
7. See Amicus Brief of American Psychiatric Association and the American Acad-
emy of Psychiatry of the Law in Support of Respondents at 19 n.15, Jaffee v. Redmond,
116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996) (No. 95-266) (stating that suit was filed "one week after the shoot-
ing," and counseling commenced "approximately a week or so after the shooting")
(quoting Joint Appendix).
8. See Jaffee. 116 S. Ct. at 1926.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1350-52 (7th Cir. 1994) (describing efforts
of the trial judge to force disclosure, then to find a middle ground when the therapist was
uncooperative; after telling Redmond she could not testify if disclosure were not made.
the court paved the way for an appeal to test the privilege point, and ultimately let
Redmond testify but told the jury there was "no legal justification" to refuse to produce
the notes, and that the jury could "presume that the contents" would be "unfavorable"),
affd 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996).
12. See id. at 1358.
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dered if the need for the proof outweighs the need for protection. 3
The court explained that the privilege rests on both instrumental and
humanistic foundations, meaning that it serves the practical purpose
of encouraging psychotherapy and protects privacy as an end in it-
self. 4 The Supreme Court mostly agreed15 and approved a federal
privilege in a 7-2 opinion, holding that it covers sessions with "li-
censed psychiatrists and psychologists" and with licensed clinical so-
cial workers "in the course of psychotherapy."16 The Court stressed
the instrumental basis more than the privacy rationale, and declined
to go along with the balancing test favored by the Seventh Circuit. 7
The opinion in Jaffee ignores the claim, advanced by the plain-
tiff,I" that Karen Beyer provided counseling that did not constitute
psychotherapy. This argument sought to distinguish between a "re-
ality interventionist" technique dealing with "situational distress"
and true psychotherapy in which the focus is upon "personality reor-
ganization." 9 Apparently Karen Beyer had listened to police tapes,
and the plaintiff argued that Beyer's focus on what actually happened
was inconsistent with psychotherapy, where the focus is on "psychic
reality" of the patient."° In ignoring this point, the Court in .affee
seems to have endorsed the view that almost any form of counseling
conducted by psychiatrists, psychologists, and clinical social workers
constitutes psychotherapy protected by the privilege. The privilege
approved in Jaffee is defined more by the professional qualifications
of the therapist than by the style or type of therapy being practiced.1
13. See id. at 1357.
14. See id. at 1356.
15. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. 1929 (Justice Stevens wiote the majority opinion. Justice
Scalia dissented, and was joined in part by Chief Justice Rehnquist).
16. Id. at 1931.
17. See id. at 1932.
18. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 5, Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996)
(No. 95-266).
19. See id. at 7.
20. Plaintiff argued that Beyer may have changed Redmond's perceptions through a
process of "behavioral confirmation," where the patient conforms to the therapist's im-
pressions about what actually happened. See id. at 7-9.
21. See also United States v. Schwensow, 942 F. Supp. 402, 406-07 (E.D. Wis. 1996)
(declining to recognize privilege covering counselors working for Alcoholics Anonymous,
who were not psychologists and did not fit the Jaffee criteria).
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11. Should We Have a Privilege? Should It Reach Clinical
Social Workers?
We need a psychotherapist-patient privilege for two broad rea-
sons, usually labeled instrumental and humanistic. The instrumental
reason is that psychotherapy serves a useful social purpose, and the
privilege supports and encourages it. The sheer number and percent-
age of the general population who reportedly need and seek help for
psychological problems,22 along with the extraordinary growth in
clinical social work, attest to the scope of the problem and indicate a
social consensus that therapy helps alleviate it.' And Jaffee itself
presents an important modern paradigm, which is the situation of an
employee in a stressful job dealing with a traumatic incident in a con-
structive way.24 The importance of therapy in this setting, and of con-
fidentiality to encourage workers to seek help without risking disclo-
sure and loss of employment, has achieved increasing recognition.
The existence of exceptions might prompt the objection that no
sensible patient could rely on protection, hence that the privilege
does not encourage people to seek therapy or to be honest with a
therapist. But this objection makes sense only if the exceptions de-
vour the rule, which does not seem to be the case. The patient him-
self controls one common exception (no privilege when he puts his
mental condition in issue),' and he is not likely to expect confidenti-
22. See Bruce J. Winick, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: A Therapeutic Juris-
prudence View. 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 249, 253 & nn.24-29 (1996) (observing that studies
estimate more than fifty-two million Americans suffer from a "specific diagnosable men-
tal disorder each year" and that only 28.5% get help).
23. See generally Michael J. Lambert & Allen E. Bergin, The Effectiveness of Psy-
chotherapy, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOTHERAPY AND BEHAVIOR CHANGE 143 (Allen E.
Bergin & Sol L. Garfield eds., 4th ed. 1992) (asserting that "psychotherapies, in general.
have positive effects").
24. See Mary P. Koss & Julia Shiang, Research on Brief Psychotherapy, in
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOTHERAPY AND BEHAVIOR CHANGE, supra note 23. at 681 (re-
porting that brief psychotherapy, as opposed to long term treatment, has been shown to
be effective in dealing with a range of problems, including "job-related stress, anxiety dis-
orders, mild depression, and grief reactions," as well as problems associated with "un-
usual stress" coming from experiences such as rape and earthquake, or other experiences
leading to post-traumatic stress disorder).
25. See, e.g., UNIF. R. EVID. 503(d)(4) (amended 1986), 13A U.L.A. 585 (1994) (cre-
ating exception for cases where patient "relies upon" mental condition "as an element" of
a claim or defense). See also UNIF. R. EVID. 503(d)(4), Action in Adopting Jurisdiction.
13A U.L.A. 585-93 (1994) (describing numerous state adoptions and variations of this
provision); Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 F.R.D. 127, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding
plaintiff waived psychotherapist-patient privilege in suit alleging that employer failed to
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ality if he indicates an intent to attack another person (another com-
mon exception).26 To be sure, some exceptions are so broad that they
might threaten the utility of the privilege, such as exceptions that ap-
ply to the defendant in some or all criminal cases or to any communi-
cation indicating harmful conduct.27 But even jurisdictions that rec-
ognize these broad exceptions still provide significant protection.
We know patients desire confidentiality." We know as well that
therapy requires a relationship in which the patient trusts the thera-
pist and that a trusting relationship between patient and therapist is
crucial not only to classical psychotherapy (patient on the couch in
regular sessions lasting months or even years) but to modem therapy
as well,29 because therapy requires the willing cooperation of the pa-
accommodate clinical depression, which led plaintiff to take medication that made it hard
for her to get up in the morning; letting her hide behind privilege when she placed that
condition at issue is contrary to basic sense of fairness and justice).
26. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 129A(2) (West 1996) (denying
privilege where patient communicates "explicit threat to kill or inflict serious bodily in-
jury upon a reasonably identified person"); State v. Bright, 683 A.2d 1055, 1064-65 (Del.
1996) (noting that well-established exception applies where mental health professional
has "affirmative duty" to others to warn of patient's dangerous propensities); United
States v. Snelenberger, 24 F.3d 799, 802 (6th Cir. 1994) (recognizing state exception to
privilege in situation of threats to harm others).
27. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 337.636 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997) (rejecting privilege for
information that "pertains to a criminal act"); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/10(a)(9)
(West 1993 & Supp. 1997) (denying privilege for disclosures that relate "directly to the
fact or immediate circumstances" of a homicide). See also discussion infra notes 67-73
and accompanying text.
28. See generally Daniel W. Shuman et al., The Privilege Study (Part III): Psycho-
therapist-Patient Communications in Canada, 9 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 393, 410 (1986)
(observing that in Canadian study, confidentiality was "an initial consideration" for 62%
of patients, and 59% "knew or guessed correctly that a professional secret exists"; among
lay people, willingness to discuss a range of issues "dropped substantially" when respon-
dents were told that no privilege applied); Daniel W. Shuman & Myron F. Weiner, The
Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60
N.C. L. REV. 893, 919-20 (1982) (finding that when asked whether they would discuss sen-
sitive subjects relating to masturbation, sexual thoughts and sexual activities without
privilege protection, rate of positive response "dropped markedly"); Comment, Func-
tional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the
Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1255 (1962) (noting that in sur-
vey, lay people said they would be less likely to make complete disclosure if psychiatrist,
psychologist, marriage counselor, or social worker had legal obligation to disclose).
29. See T. Byram Karasu, Psychoanalysis and Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy, in 1
COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1775 (Harold I. Kaplan & Benjamin J. Sa-
dock eds., 6th ed. 1995) (stating that "[n]o analysis can proceed without the formation of a
rational, trusting therapeutic alliance; its establishment is the first task of treatment be-
fore a deeper transference neurosis can be facilitated."); Lambert & Bergin, supra note
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tient in unearthing memories that the patient prefers not to call into
his conscious mind.30 We also know that therapy turns on the will-
ingness of the patient to speak openly of personal thoughts and feel-
ings on relationships, acts and events, capabilities, outlooks, fears,
and fantasies, and indeed that simply talking may be therapeutic in
raising to conscious expression feelings previously inaccessible to
conscious thought.31 Finally, we know therapists inform patients
about the limits of confidentiality in private sessions.32 Given this
much knowledge (which includes some empirical data), it is a fair, if
not inescapable, conclusion that the privilege positively contributes
to the willingness to seek therapy and to the efficacy of treatment.
Admittedly the instrumentalist argument is weakened by the ab-
sence of empirical verification relating to the privilege itself.33 We
must at least pause to consider the claim that the cost of the privilege
23, at 181 (observing that most modern therapists are "eclectic" in their orientation, em-
ploying "mixtures" of psychoanalytic techniques; "[iJnterpersonal, social, and affective
factors common across therapies still loom large as stimulators of patient improvement":
whether therapist is dealing with depression, inadequacy, anxiety or inner conflicts.
treatment is facilitated by a relationship between patient and therapist that includes
"trust, warmth, acceptance, and human wisdom").
30. See Mark B. DeKraai & Bruce D. Sales, Privileged Communications of Psy-
chologists, 13 PROF. PSYCHOLOGIST 372, 372 (1982) (noting that trust toward therapist is
so important that some say therapy is "rendered worthless in its absence"); R. HORACIO
ETCHEGOYEN, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF PSYCHOANALYTIC TECHNIQUE 9 (1991) (stat-
ing "things are forgotten if one does not wish to remember them, because they are pain-
ful, ugly and disagreeable, contrary to ethics and/or aesthetics").
31. See SIGMUND FREUD, The Interpretation of Dreams, in 4 THE COMPLETE
PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 100 (1958) (finding that if symptom can
be traced to "elements in the patient's mental life from which it originated, it simultane-
ously crumbles away and the patient is freed from it"). See also David Louisell, The Psv-
chologist in Today's Legal World: Part H, 41 MINN. L. REV. 731, 746-47 (1957) (con-
cluding that the art of therapy "seems to consist in helping the patient learn for himself
the causes of his conduct and the methods of correction"); CHARLES BRENNER. AN
ELEMENTARY TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 7 (Rev. ed., Int'l Universities Press
1973) (1955) (observing that the essence of Freud's psychoanalytic technique is that "the
patient undertakes to report to the analyst without exception whatever thoughts come
into his mind and to refrain from exercising over them either conscious direction or cen-
sorship").
32. See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF
PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT Standard 5.01 (1992) (stating that therapist
must advise patients of "the relevant limits on confidentiality").
33. See generally Shuman et al., supra note 28, at 416-17 (explaining that treatment
occurs "without regard to the existence of a privilege," and privilege is better supported
by humanistic than instrumental arguments); Shuman & Weiner. supra note 28, at 928
(noting that survey of lay persons, patients, therapists, and judges shows that privilege
may affect "efficacy" of therapy for only a "small percentage" of people).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49
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is manifest while the benefit is a matter of guesswork34 and the re-
lated objection that we have no concrete comparison between the
value of therapeutic gains and the cost of lost proof.5 But these ob-
jections are less than definitive, and the instrumentalist rationale re-
mains persuasive for several reasons.
First, it counts that patients want and expect confidentiality, and
it counts that doing away with the privilege would require therapists,
as a matter of human decency and professional duty, to advise pa-
tients fairly about disclosure risks.36 Taking even a mild version of
the rationalist perspective on which law depends, it is likely that the
privilege aids the process even if we cannot find measurable results. 7
This appraisal does not depend on a supposition that patients think
about privilege law. In fields as disparate as contracts, torts, and em-
ployment discrimination, we seek to affect outcomes not only by the
34. See MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at § 72; WIGMoRE, supra note 3, at § 2291.
35. In Jaffee, Justice Scalia protests that merely "mentioning" competing values of
therapy and the search for truth "does not answer the critical question," which is whether
the contribution of therapy to mental health is sufficiently great to justify "making our
federal courts occasional instruments of injustice." See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1934
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). This objection applies to privileges in general.
36. Professor Winick argues that a decision rejecting a federal privilege would be-
come known. Hence, even if patients generally know nothing about privilege law, they
would hear of such a decision, particularly in the setting of Jaffee itself, in which an officer
involved in a shooting anticipates a civil rights suit. Professor Winnick may be right, and
certainly it is predictable that therapists would feel compelled to bring up the matter even
if patients have not heard of it. See Bruce J. Winick, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privi-
lege: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence View, 50 U. MIAMI L. REv. 249, 257 (1996) (assuming
a decision rejecting the privilege, asking whether police officer involved in a shooting and
lawsuit would "seek out counseling" in the knowledge that details revealed in therapy
"could be the subject of an evidentiary fishing expedition" and whether a sexual assault
victim would "seek counseling" if she knew the assailant's attorney "could seek discovery
of what she said in therapy").
37. The indicated conclusion is as strong as in the setting of the attorney-client
privilege, where few people doubt the need for a privilege. In his dissent in Jaffee, Justice
Scalia asks, "[H]ow come psychotherapy got to be a thriving practice before the 'psycho-
therapist privilege' was invented? Were the patients paying money to lie to their analysts
all those years?" Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1935 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But this rhetorical ar-
gument is filled with assumptions: that psychotherapy was not a "thriving practice" in the
distant past, that the privilege is a new invention, and that the privilege therefore did not
contribute to the development of psychotherapy. Psychotherapy certainly is a major fea-
ture of the social landscape today, but it is hardly a new invention and has been a signifi-
cant and visible element of American life for generations, and in any event the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege has itself been a feature of the legal landscape for quite some
time, having been recognized in federal court some 43 years ago. See Taylor v. United
States, 222 F.2d 398,401 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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direct impact of doctrine applied with precision in litigation, but also
by the indirect and more diffuse effect of doctrine in supporting so-
cial understandings and expectations. It is those understandings and
expectations that affect behavior on an everyday basis.38 It is prob-
able too that a privilege assists the therapist in her work, since any
conscientious person would be reluctant to encourage another to
make disclosures (or to keep records of such disclosures) in the
knowledge that the information thus gleaned could be forced from
the therapist in the form of testimony against the patient. 9
Second, the point about comparative costs is not compelling. It
is unsurprising that nobody attempts an apples-and-oranges compari-
son, which would convince few people. And the premise that would
likely go with such a comparison, which is that doing away with the
privilege would produce for the future all the evidence that successful
claims of privilege now suppress, assumes that patients would say as
much (and psychotherapists could be forced to disclose as much) in a
nonprivileged environment. But we have reason to suppose there
would be less therapy, less disclosure, and less in the way of record-
keeping by therapists in that environment.
The humanistic basis for the psychotherapist-patient privilege
rests on the right of privacy.4" This value finds expression in the Con-
38. Shuman and Weiner, who support the privilege on humanistic grounds but argue
that the instrumentalist justification has not been made, give too much weight to knowl-
edge of the privilege itself. See Shuman & Weiner, supra note 28. at 920-21 (concluding
most patients "relied more heavily on the therapist's ethics for confidentiality" than a
privilege of which they were unaware, so enactment of a privilege has "no effect" on suc-
cess or failure of therapy). But confidentiality is exactly the point, and a legal doctrine
that creates an environment in which confidentiality can be assumed is important to the
behavior that depends on confidentiality. See Thomas Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privi-
leges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62
GEO. L.J. 61, 92 (1973) (explaining that the fact that people communicate without being
aware of a privilege "proves little without the further assumption that subconscious, unar-
ticulated knowledge never can influence human conduct").
39. See generally Note, Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1476 (1985) (suggesting that professional people "often must press
reluctant or confused people to speak, especially when embarrassing secrets are in-
volved," and the absence of a privilege would subject the professional person to "con-
flicting duties" to obtain complete information, maintain client confidences, and testify in
court).
40. See RAYMOND L. SPRING ET AL., PATIENTS, PSYCHIATRISTS AND LAWYERS:
LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 215 (2d ed. 1997) (contrasting historic justifica-
tions for privilege law stressing the protection of specific relationships with modern justi-
fications for the psychotherapist privilege which "tend to rely more on privacy as a basis")
(2d ed. 1997).
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stitution and in doctrines developed by the Supreme Court to protect
citizens from prying by police and from legislative regulation of areas
like marriage, contraception and abortion. This value also finds ex-
pression in rules relating to proof and practice in the courtroom, such
as rape shield laws and the rule authorizing judges to shield witnesses
from abuse and embarrassment.41 In the setting of psychotherapy,
privacy is rightly elevated as important because trust and expressive
freedom are vital to the process. And more broadly still, privacy is a
critical aspect of a free society for reasons relating to personal auton-
omy, emotional development, self-appraisal and general happiness,
all of which have obvious connections with therapy.4
It is true that there is no general right of privacy enabling liti-
gants or witnesses to block proof of private behaviors that may be
embarrassing or mortifying. There is no general right to block in-
quiry into confidential communications with family or friends, where
surely all of us seek and obtain help and support in adjusting to the
world and working through the problems of living.43 And Jaffee does
not cover sessions with people who provide therapy (or purport to
provide it) without a license. Hence the privilege approved in Jaffee
is arguably flawed because it is too narrow to satisfy either the hu-
manistic or the instrumental purpose. Even worse, this objection
prompts the suggestion that the privilege is really a dignitary doctrine
that serves the interest of the profession that it covers rather than
broader social needs. This critique has some force, but in the end it is
not convincing.
To begin with, other aspects of privacy are protected. The
privilege for spousal confidences covers the most critical realm of
41. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412 (creating a rape shield statute blocking inquiry into
past sexual behavior by complaining witnesses); United States v. Lopez, 611 F.2d 44, 45
(4th Cir. 1979) (concluding that psychological history is an area of "great personal pri-
vacy" that generally has but minimal probative value on matters of general credibility);
United States v. Jackson, 155 F.R.D. 664, 669 (D. Kan. 1994) (holding with reasoning
similar to Lopez); State v. Zuck, 658 P.2d 162, 166 (Ariz. 1983) (explaining that courts
may "protect witnesses against cross-examination that does little to impair credibility, but
that may be invasive of their privacy").
42 See WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 32-37 (1973) (suggesting that privacy pro-
tects personal autonomy, provides for emotional release, and allows self-appraisal which
are necessary to self-realization and psychological balance).
43. Justice Scalia argues that people work out their problems by talking to "parents,
siblings, best friends and bartenders," and that the average citizen would gain more by
getting advice from his "mom" than from licensed therapists. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116
S. Ct. 1923, 1934 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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private communications (the area that seems most important to the
greatest number) and a privilege covers religious consultations (in-
cluding the confessional).44 A broader familial privilege reaching
conversations between parent and child and among siblings is not out
of the question and may be warranted."
It is true that other private conversations are not privileged, even
if private, intimate and "therapeutic." People sometimes have such
talks in the belief that what they say cannot come back to haunt
them, like conversations with trusted friends, bartenders or running
partners. And people sometimes "bare their souls" or "unload" on
passing acquaintances in the belief that the conversation is safe be-
cause neither expects to see the other again or to have overlapping
contacts. But lack of privilege here does not mean the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege is fatally narrow, nor undercut the theory that it
provides important protection for privacy as a value in itself. The
area covered by the privileges mentioned above is, after all, very sub-
stantial. And what is not covered is often undiscoverable and unus-
able anyhow, meaning privacy is preserved even without a privilege-
familial communications are hard to get at if the witness is reluctant
to cooperate, 46 and conversations with bartenders and passing ac-
quaintances are beyond reach in all but high-profile criminal prosecu-
44. See generally GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE §§ 501.6,
501.7 (1995) (describing spousal privileges and stating that both state and federal courts
recognize clergyman-parishioner privilege): CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE §§ 5.33-5.34, 5.38 (1995) (describing spousal and religious
privileges).
45. Compare In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Unemancipated Minor Child, 949 F.
Supp. 1487, 1497 (E.D. Wash. 1996) (recognizing federal common law familial privilege
allowing children to refuse to testify against parents, partly on basis of Jaffee; leaving
open possibility of constitutionally-based privilege) with In re Grand Jury Proceedings.
103 F.3d 1140, 1146 (3d Cir. 1997) (refusing to quash grand jury subpoena that would re-
quire parent to testify against child; rejecting claim of federal parent-child privilege: not-
ing under Jaffee, federal court should look to state law for guidance, but only Idaho, Min-
nesota, Massachusetts, and common law tradition in New York allow for such a privilege).
46. Lawyers and courts are reluctant to push too hard to get information from intact
families. And in this setting perjury and evasion are likely, and predictably hard to de-
tect. overcome, or punish. See generally Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before
the Special Subcomm. on Reform of the Fed. Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2, at 240, 241-42 (1973) (letter by Charles L. Black, Jr.
to the Honorable William Hungate) (criticizing proposed abolition of spousal confidences
privilege by commenting: "It ought to be enough to say of such a rule that it could eas-
ily-even often-force any decent person-anybody any of us would want to associate
with-either to lie or to go to jail. No rule can be good that has that consequence-that
compels the decent and honorable to evade or to disobey it.").
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tions or civil litigation (O.J. Simpson, JonBenet Ramsey, the tobacco
litigation).
It is also notable that other therapeutic privileges are sometimes
recognized. The most prominent example is the widely-recognized
rape counselor privilege,47 and there are others.4" In the end, it is less
plausible to look at these as professional dignitary privileges, born of
lobbying efforts by professional groups, than as legislative responses
to felt needs to encourage and secure assistance for people and to
recognize a social interest in privacy.
Finally, there is such a thing as being too embarrassed about
crafting an imperfect rule. We often face choices between a failsafe
rule that is too general and uncertain for ready application and a
clear rule that is too broad or too narrow. As a compromise between
functionality and precision, the Jaffee rule merits respect (along with
the state law on which it depends). In covering sessions with licensed
psychotherapists, Jaffee reaches a critical category of cases in which
therapy is the purpose and privacy is both needed and expected. Yet
the Jaffee rule can be applied in the press of trial, since it reaches
only counseling sessions with licensed therapists.
In the late twentieth century the privilege should extend to coun-
seling performed by clinical social workers. The main reason is that
training and experience justify the view that they provide profes-
sional therapy: they receive extended training, perform an appren-
ticeship, and provide mental health services.49 Hence, the objection
47. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1035-1036 (West 1995) (providing elaborate privilege
covering communications between sexual assault victim and counselor); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 90.5035 (West 1979 & Supp. 1998) (creating sexual assault counselor-victim privilege);
United States v. Lowe, 948 F. Supp. 97, 99 (D. Mass. 1996) (recognizing federal rape
counselor privilege under Jaffee in federal trial on crimes including sexual offenses, citing
Justice Department Report that twenty-seven states protect confidentiality in this set-
ting); Commonwealth v. Fuller, 667 N.E.2d 847, 853 (Mass. 1996) (reversing order by trial
judge requiring rape counseling center to turn over records; balancing need for disclosure
against need for privacy of rape victim dictates that the latter prevails; statutory privilege
contains no exception, except providing that defense right to cross-examine counselor is
not limited if counselor testifies with victim's written consent); Commonwealth v. Askew,
666 A.2d 1062, 1064-65 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (denying new trial motion after conviction
on various sexual abuse charges; statutory privilege denies defendant the right to records
of rape counseling center relating to victim).
48. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1037.5 (West 1995) (codifying domestic violence
counseling privilege).
49. The applicable Illinois statute requires a licensed clinical social worker to have a
master's or doctoral degree in social work, three years of supervised clinical practice, and
requires in addition that she pass an exam and either complete 3,000 hours of supervised
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that they lack the kind of professional qualifications possessed by
psychologists and psychiatrists is not serious enough to justify reject-
ing privilege protection." And the increasing importance of their
role in late twentieth century America goes far to explain why forty-
five of the fifty state legislatures extend privilege protection to com-
munications with social workers."
II. State Law As Source of Federal Privilege
Jaffee is a federal question case, and its mandate applies only in
this setting. 2 However, the Court was wise to look to state law for
guidance. The main reason is that states, more than federal courts,
have addressed the subject in detail, while Congress has been silent
and federal appellate precedent is sparse. States have statutory and
appellate law that is far "thicker" (more plentiful and detailed) than
federal law. States deal routinely with child abuse and sexual as-
saults, where, not surprisingly, claims of psychotherapist-patient
privilege are commonly tested. In these and other settings, such as
criminal prosecutions where the defense claims insanity, state courts
deal regularly with waiver and coverage issues.
Yet a huge methodological difficulty lies ahead. The Court in
Jaffee stressed that state "policy decisions" bear on the question of
whether federal courts should "recognize a new privilege" or "amend
the coverage" of an old one.53 The implication is that state law does
clinical experience or get a doctoral degree and complete 2,000 hours of supervised clini-
cal work. See 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 20/3, 20/9 (West 1993).
50. In his dissent, Justice Scalia argues that there is no assurance that licensed social
workers are shown to have the "greatly heightened degree of skill" that justifies extend-
ing a privilege to psychiatrists or psychologists. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. at 1937
(Scalia. J.. dissenting).
51. Only Alabama, Alaska, Hawaii, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania are missing
from the list of states with a privilege for communications with social workers. See Jaffee.
116 S. Ct. at 1931 n.17.
52. Jaffee has no direct application in the state court system, although state judges
may well give weight to the decision as a matter of comity. Nor does Jaffee apply in di-
versity cases litigated in federal court, where Federal Rule of Evidence 501 requires fed-
eral courts simply to apply state privilege law. Technically, Federal Rule of Evidence 501
requires federal courts to apply state privilege law "with respect to an element of a claim
or defense" where state law "supplies the rule of decision," which describes a category of
cases that differs slightly from "diversity cases." In all other cases, federal courts are to
apply federal law. See generally 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
174 (2d ed. 1994).
53. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929-30 (stressing further that a state "consensus" in recog-
nizing the privilege provides a basis in "reason and experience" to recognize a federal
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not merely point out a direction to consider, but plays a larger role
and bears importantly on the content of federal law. This reading is
strengthened by the comment in Jaffee that state privilege law would
"have little value" if the patient knew federal courts would not honor
it, and that denying a federal privilege would "frustrate the purposes"
of state law. 4 The problem is that state law of psychotherapist-
patient privilege is mostly statutory, and the statutes address critical
issues of coverage, exceptions, and waiver in detail. Needless to say,
however, they conflict on important points." Here is the question
that remains: How can federal courts constructively use state law to
fashion a federal privilege? On this point, Jaffee offers little guid-
ance.
Under one possible approach to this problem, federal courts
would follow state law on psychotherapist-patient privilege. But this
approach seemingly violates Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 501.
For one thing, it would lead to a nonuniform body of law, which is at
odds with the mandate of FRE 501 to fashion federal law in this area.
This approach would not involve choices based on "reason" exercised
by federal courts on the basis of "experience." State law, after all, is
largely statutory, comprised of abstract commands that were crafted
in a political process of bargaining and compromise. It is policy-
based and value-laden, and it did not grow out of the common law
process. That process is one in which courts come over time to favor
a particular solution by making incremental moves, drawing from so-
cial values and traditions and testing outcomes over an extended pe-
riod of time. Emphatically, the rules and statutes on point are not the
product of this kind of organic growth and refinement.
Under what seems to be the only alternative, a federal court
following Jaffee would look to the statute or rule in the state where it
sits as one of many reference points in deciding the content of the
federal rule.56 (Other reference points include the rules or statutes in
privilege, and that it makes "no difference" that state law on point is statutory).
54. See id. at 1930.
55. It does not follow that they do not count in fashioning federal law: just as the
unanimity of states in recognizing the privilege should inform the exercise of "reason" in
light of "experience" on the question whether to recognize a federal privilege, so the de-
tails of statutory treatment should inform the exercise of reason in light of experience in
deciding particular privilege issues.
56. Since privilege law is substantive, a court should not invariably apply forum law.
Sometimes the court should look to the law of some other state, especially if the relation-
ship or communications covered by the privilege were centered there. Practically speak-
ing, however, such "horizontal choice of law problems" seldom arise. See generally 2
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force in other states.) Under this approach, the court may sometimes
depart from the result required by local statute. Holding a matter
privileged as a matter of federal law where the state rule or statute
requires disclosure seems wrong, and would surely be a peculiar out-
come. As Jaffee itself indicates, the fact that the underlying substan-
tive issues are federal does not justify such a departure. Further.
holding a matter nonprivileged under federal law where a state stat-
ute provides protection also seems wrong. It would frustrate the
purpose of state law, to which the Court in Jaffee so carefully de-
ferred.
Departing in either of these ways from the mandate of state law
might be justified if the privilege claim dealt with therapy sessions
conducted by a federal officer or as part of a federal program, but
only if something in the federal statutory framework points the way
toward such a conclusion. In other cases, departing in such ways
from local law would likely involve following some other state statute
on the ground that it is wiser in its policy or provisions. Simply se-
lecting one statute or another involves a naked political choice that is
similar in nature to the ones made by state legislatures, and it seems
incompatible with FRE 501's directive to fashion federal common
law on the basis of reason and experience. 7 A more elaborate proc-
ess could satisfy FRE 501, but it would require federal courts to
evaluate the content, policies, and suitability of competing statutory
choices, and the process would not produce a coherent body of law
soon.
This game is not worth the candle. The first approach described
above is superior to the second. At least in the area of the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege, FRE 501 should defer to state privilege
law in all federal litigation. This deference would properly be subject
to whatever action Congress might take to create specific enclaves of
federal privilege law relating to specific federal programs or federal
agents, in which case presumably state courts would recognize these
federal privileges too. Beyond the methodological difficulties
sketched above, there is another good reason for federal courts sim-
ply to apply state law in this area. Privilege law is substantive be-
cause it is part of the regulation of out-of-court relationships
(spouses, lawyer-client, therapist-patient). Neither Congress nor fed-
eral rulemakers have stepped into this field, nor is it likely that they
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 176 (2d ed. 1994).
57. FED. R. EVID. 501.
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will do so, even assuming that the Constitution allows it. The federal
interests at stake in a civil rights action against a local police officer
do not justify legislation regulating the relationship between patients
and psychotherapists, or a narrower rule addressing counseling ob-
tained by police officers. The Court in Jaffee appears to recognize
this fact, even though its solution was a mandate to create what is
theoretically federal law in this area.
The reality is that while Jaffee puts federal courts in a difficult
position, the problem is in the broader legal environment rather than
Jaffee itself. The solution is to amend FRE 501, at least as it applies
to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, or to adopt a new rule re-
quiring federal courts to apply state psychotherapist-patient privi-
leges unless Congress directs otherwise.
IV. Problems of Coverage and Exceptions
In two broad areas, sound application of the privilege will be
particularly challenging. One involves cases where the privilege
claimant testifies, particularly where she is also a party whose testi-
mony is crucial. The other is the setting of abuse or sexual assault
prosecutions, where the privilege might or might not apply to coun-
seling or therapy obtained by the defendant or the victim.
Jaffee exemplifies the first problem. In Jaffee, defendant Mary
Lu Redmond was the privilege claimant, and she testified that she
fired the fatal shot when she saw the decedent Ricky Allen carrying a
butcher knife poised to stab a man he was chasing out of an apart-
ment complex. But Redmond testified that her memory at trial was
better than it was after the event, and her therapist testified that in an
early interview Redmond could not remember pulling the trigger. "
Arguing that extensive counseling had affected Redmond's memory
and testimony, the plaintiff asked the court to treat the situation with
the elevated concern it had shown ten years earlier when it faced the
issue of hypnotically-refreshed testimony.59 There the Court spoke of
confabulation, memory hardening, and suggestibility, and approved
safeguards against such risks, including the use of tapes of hypnotic
sessions to guard against inaccuracy.' By analogy, plaintiffs might
also have invoked the situation in which a client reviews documents
58. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3 n.1, Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (No.
95-266).
59. See Brief for Petitioner at 23, Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (No. 95-266).
60. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44,59-60 (1987).
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in preparation for testifying at trial, where some courts conclude that
this strategy removes the protection of the attorney-client privilege
that might otherwise apply.61 In Jaffee, Redmond began what was to
stretch into 50-odd therapy sessions at the time suit was filed,62 and
she and her therapist must have known they were going over the
ground that Redmond would cover in her testimony at trial.
63
Here the stakes on both sides are high. On the one hand, it is
here that the privilege poses a stark threat to the truth-seeking enter-
prise, since it operates not merely to deny access to evidence, but to
hide from view a process that may shape critical trial testimony by a
party. Hence, it is here that the claim, which any competent cross-
examining lawyer would quickly make, carries some weight: "I need
access to her pretrial statements and to the interviews and other ma-
terial that may have shaped her testimony." Yet the value of the
privilege depends heavily on allowing protection in this setting. In-
deed, there would be almost nothing left if protection were lost
whenever the underlying subject matter of the conversations were
useful in impeachment. In the similar situation in which the com-
plainant testifies in a sexual assault trial, significant modern authority
denies defense access to records of rape counseling sessions (which
are covered by a separate privilege). 4 Arguably, the cases requiring
disclosure of materials covered by the attorney-client privilege,
where these are reviewed prior to testifying, differ because they pre-
sumably involve an active effort to coach the witness. At least some
modern cases seek to preserve privilege protection even in this set-
ting, and at most they endorse the practice of in camera review to de-
61. See Lowe v. White and Spicer, 1990 WL 251387 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990) (showing
document to witness to refresh memory before giving deposition waives work product
protection); Samaritan Health Servs., Inc. v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 154, 157 (Ariz.
1984) (stating that while pretrial review waives attorney-client privilege, court should
conduct in camera inspection rather than order blanket disclosure).
62. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1926.
63. Psychotherapy might bring to light entirely new thoughts, even about something
as prosaic as an accidental shooting. See BRENNER, supra note 31, at 137, for a descrip-
tion of a patient who "struck an elderly man with his left, front fender and knocked him to
the ground," and who believed afterwards that he "had not seen the man at all" when he
slowed to a speed of five miles per hour in preparation for making a lefthand turn at a
busy intersection. Later during therapy, the man recalled that "he was not surprised
when he felt his car hit something," and suggesting that the driver's "unconscious motive
for the mishap was" to "destroy his own father," even though he had been dead for a
number of years; these motives were the sources of the patient's "subsequent guilt and
fear."
64. See supra note 47.
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termine whether privileged materials apparently affected trial testi-
mony.6
State psychotherapist-patient privilege law does not recognize an
exception for cases where the privilege claimant testifies as a party at
trial. Instead, most state law deals with the issue by sacrificing pro-
tection in a narrower class of cases where the privilege claimant is a
party who puts her mental condition in issue. Here, sustaining a
privilege would deny access to evidence that is relevant and useful for
impeachment, and also crucial to a central issue injected by the
privilege claimant. Yet even here, some modern courts indicate that
privilege protection is not to be lightly sacrificed, guarding against
manipulation by the side challenging a privilege claim.'
The silence of the Court in Jaffee speaks volumes. The indicated
conclusion is that the patient who testifies as a party does not lose the
protection of the psychotherapist-patient privilege on that account.
The situation of victims or complaining witnesses in sexual as-
sault and child abuse trials is even more difficult. Here, credibility
issues loom large and proof is hard to come by, so shielding the sub-
65. See Al-Rowaishan Establishment Universal Trading & Agencies, Ltd. v. Beatrice
Foods Co., 92 F.R.D. 779, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (refusing to order disclosure of abstracts of
prior depositions prepared by lawyer and reviewed by witness in preparing for subsequent
deposition, where abstracts contained mental impressions of attorney); Thomas v. State,
1997 WL 235504 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (denying waiver of work product protection in
prosecutor's use of list of proposed questions in preparing witness, as judge found witness
had not refreshed recollection by looking at questions; however, disclosure ordered of
notes witness prepared on anticipated answers); Northern Montana Hospital v. Knight,
811 P.2d 1276, 1281-82 (Mont. 1991) (finding that documents reviewed by architect prior
to testifying in deposition were not related to his testimony and were in any event pro-
tected by attorney-client privilege; disclosure unnecessary under Montana Rule 612);
Farm Credit Bank v. Huether, 454 N.W.2d 710, 718 (N.D. 1990) (stating that under Rule
612, documents "specifically referred to in testimony" were subject to disclosure "even if
previously privileged," but not other documents); Girrens v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.,
715 P.2d 389, 396-97 (Kan. 1986) (finding that in reviewing transcript of his own oral
statement to his attorney while preparing for deposition, plaintiff did not waive attorney-
client privilege; state has no counterpart to Federal Rule of Evidence 612). See also
Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 645 N.E.2d 1170, 1175-76 (Mass. 1994) (showing notes to wit-
ness on stand waives work product protection for notes, leaving open the question
whether the same result obtains when notes are shown to witness before she testifies).
66. See Kinsella v. Kinsella, 696 A.2d 556, 571 (N.J. 1997) (denying access to hus-
band's psychiatric records in custody battle despite husband's allegations of extreme cru-
elty by wife); Clark v. District Court, 668 P.2d 3, 8-10 (Colo. 1983) (finding that in wrong-
ful death suit, where plaintiff claimed that defendant's employee had history of mental
illness, denial of liability did not waive privilege, nor did testimony by employee admitting
that he had obtained counseling and treatment).
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stance of post-event therapy appears costly. Yet most cases hold that
the privilege has some application in these settings.67 Courts continue
to reach this outcome despite the Supreme Court's 1986 decision in
Ritchie indicating that disclosure of state therapy records is constitu-
tionally required as a defense right, at least if in camera inspection
discloses information useful to the defense. 68 But Ritchie dealt with
official records in the possession of the state where the disclosure
duty is well established,69 not records of a therapist in private prac-
tice, and the decision is carefully circumscribed. Also, while the
opinion is sympathetic to the state's nondisclosure policy, Ritchie
stresses that the statute allows disclosure in some situations and
leaves room for speculation that the result might have been different
if the files were not even accessible to the police. Hence, Ritchie
allows protection of such material.
Privacy has meaning and weight in this setting, and encouraging
therapy is an obvious social priority. Here patients talk to therapists
on sensitive matters, bringing great potential for embarrassment.
Hence, the decision to accord the protection of the privilege is clearly
defensible and arguably correct. Accordingly, state legislative deci-
sions should count heavily in federal cases, unless federal elements
(such as federal policies respecting military personnel or Native
67. In the area of child abuse prosecutions, see United States v. Haworth, 168 F.R.D.
660, 661-62 (D.N.M. 1996) (denying defense motion to discover records of psychothera-
pist who examined witness; this material was privileged under Jaffee; disclosure was not
warranted, but defendants may cross-examine witness "fully" regarding his treatment);
Farrell L. v. Superior Court, 250 Cal. Rptr. 25 (Cal. App. 1988) (applying psychotherapist-
patient privilege to group therapy sessions attended by sexual assault victim after assault).
In the area of sexual assault prosecutions, see People v. District Court, 719 P.2d 722, 724-
26 (Colo. 1986) (vacating order requiring pretrial disclosure of victim's treatment records
covered by psychotherapist-patient privilege, ensuing developments might waive privi-
lege).
68. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58-60 (1987) (finding that in child sexual
abuse trial, defense was entitled to in camera review of records of state Children and
Youth Services file to determine whether they contained information relevant to the de-
fense claim of innocence; full disclosure, however, would unnecessarily sacrifice state's
"compelling interest in protecting its child-abuse information"). See also People v.
Hammon, 938 P.2d 986, 993 (Cal. 1997) (concluding that in trial for molestation of defen-
dant's foster child, no Sixth Amendment confrontation right to require in camera review
of child's psychiatric records, to which defendant sought pretrial access for purposes of
cross-examination at trial; records fit psychotherapist-patient privilege); Dill v. State, 927
P.2d 1315, 1322-24 (Colo. 1996) (rejecting defense argument in child abuse prosecution
concerning defense right to notes of psychiatric sessions).
69. See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57-58.
70. See id. at 58 n.4.
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Americans) justify formal creation of distinctly separate and context-
specific federal privilege law. Here particularly, second-guessing
state legislative solutions by choosing the "best law" seems inappro-
priate.
When it comes to therapy sessions involving defendants in child
abuse trials, the prevailing attitude is quite different. Some states
deny privilege protection to those charged with child abuse, 1 al-
though others come out the other way72 and some distinguish be-
tween child abuse and sexual offenses (denying the privilege only in
the former setting).73
Here too, privacy has meaning and weight, and encouraging
therapy should be a social priority. And here too patients speak of
sensitive matters. Denying the privilege to defendants means they
are in effect both presumed guilty and deemed less worthy of protec-
tion. In Jaffee, Justice Scalia built on this proposition by arguing that
one ought not to have confidential therapy while falsely denying mis-
deeds in court.74 In an attempt to confer doctrinal legitimacy upon
this view, plaintiffs in Jaffee suggested that the privilege issue could
71. See Dill v. State, 927 P.2d 1315, 1319 (Colo. 1996) (finding state statute abrogates
privilege when therapist prepares report about abuse, but later sessions with pa-
tientvictim are still covered by privilege; no violation of defense rights in not turning over
notes of later sessions); State v. Smith 933 S.W.2d 450, 457 (Tenn. 1996) (admitting
statements by defendant to counselor in private mental health center in sexual battery
trial; no common law privilege, and statutory privilege is expressly abrogated in sexual
offense cases); State v. Jett, 626 S.2d 691, 692-93 (Fla. 1993) (observing that psychothera-
pist-patient privilege is abrogated by statute in any trial involving offense defined as child
abuse or neglect).
72. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1010-1027 (West 1995 & Supp. 1998) (creating psycho-
therapist-patient privilege and specifying exceptions, but making no exception for consul-
tations involving sexual offenders or child abusers); People v. Stritzinger, 668 P.2d 738,
744-45 (Cal. 1983) (recognizing that exception for statements by victim of child abuse
does not remove privilege covering communications with defendant). See also In re Mat-
thew R., 688 A.2d 955, 963-65 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (applying privilege in child ne-
glect proceedings against mother to her treatment records; where state put her condition
in issue, her denials did not waive protection of privilege).
73. See IDAHO R. EVID. 503(d)(4) (creating exception to psychotherapist-patient
privilege for communications "relevant to an issue concerning the physical, mental, or
emotional condition of or injury to a child, or concerning the welfare of a child," including
abuse, abandonment or neglect).
74. Justice Scalia can "see no reason" why officer Redmond "should be enabled both
not to admit" that she shot an "innocent man" (if that is what happened) "and to get the
benefits of psychotherapy by admitting it to a therapist who cannot tell anyone else." Jaf-
fee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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be usefully compared to Miranda75 issues when the defendant testifies
as a witness (when Miranda-barred statements are admissible to im-
peach the defendant).76
Suffice it to say that the Court did not go in that direction in Jaf-
fee, and rightly so: the twin policies underlying the privilege are to
encourage therapy and protect privacy, and they seem to apply as
much to people who misbehave or commit crimes as they apply to
others. The attorney-client privilege is a closer analogy than the
Miranda doctrine, and of course both the guilty and the innocent can
claim the attorney-client privilege. The Miranda doctrine has noth-
ing to do with privacy or encouraging professional services, and the
wrinkle that permits the impeaching use of Miranda-barred state-
ments reflects a considered judgment that the prophylactic purpose,
which is to control police interrogations, is adequately served by
blocking only the substantive use of statements obtained in violation
of Miranda rights.77
In the end, however, the differing judgments reflected in state
rules on this point deserve respect. Those states that deny the privi-
lege to the defendant in an abuse or sexual assault case have decided
that the difficulties of proof and the importance of successful prose-
cution weigh heavily enough to justify an exception to the privilege.
Unless federal elements appear, it is thus inappropriate to second
guess state legislative solutions by choosing the "best law."
Conclusion
The Court in Jaffee did the right thing in recognizing a federal
psychotherapist-patient privilege, applying it to therapeutic sessions
with a licensed clinical social worker, and looking to state law as a
source. But the task of making federal doctrine with appropriate
deference to state privilege law is one that cannot be successfully pur-
sued, and a better solution is to recognize state psychotherapist-
privilege law in all federal litigation.
75. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
76. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 11 n.27, Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996)
(No. 95-266).
77. The exception was carved out in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971)
(admitting Miranda-barred statements to impeach defendants who testify), and later fol-
lowed in related areas. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980) (fash-
ioning similar result for evidence seized in violation of Fourth Amendment); Michigan v.
Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 345-46 (1990) (establishing similar result for evidence seized in
violation of the Sixth Amendment).
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Difficult choices lie ahead. It seems right to apply the privilege
to conversations involving a witness who testifies at trial, but even
harder choices must be made in sexual assault and child abuse cases.
These are not common in federal court, but they do arise, and each
federal court should follow the law of the state where it sits. Ac-
cordingly, while long term difficulties will arise if the theory is that
federal courts are making federal privilege law, this practice will
nonetheless achieve the best possible result.

